# Preparedness and Control Challenges for an FMD Outbreak in the U.S.

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#### United States has had Nine Outbreaks of FMD Between 1870 and 1929

- All outbreaks were controlled by stop movement and stamping out
- Herds were very small and there was very little animal movement
- Stamping out may no longer be feasible

Factors Requiring a Change in the Planned Response to FMD

Very large herd sizes located in close proximity

Premises with: >5,000 dairy cows >70,000 dairy calves >50,000 feedlot cattle >20,000 sows



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Factors Requiring a Change in the Planned Response to FMD

- Extensive movement of animals
  - ~1,000,000 swine and ~400,000 cattle in transit daily
- Inadequate biosecurity
- Very high cost of stamping out
- Public resistance to stamping out
- Environmental concerns with carcass disposal

# Secure Food Supply Plans

#### HPAI

- Secure Egg Supply
- Secure Turkey Supply
- Secure Broiler Supply

# SECURE POULTRY SUPPLY

#### FMD

- Secure Milk Supply
- Secure Beef Supply
- FMD, CSF & ASF
  - Secure Pork Supply



http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/Secure-Food-Supply/index.php

### Phases and Types of FMD Response



Strategies for the response to, and management of, an FMD outbreak will change as the outbreak progresses and will depend upon the magnitude, location and other characteristics of the outbreak.

www.cfsph.iastate.edu/pdf/phases-and-types-of-an-fmd-outbreak

# Potential Phases of an FMD Response

FMD response and management strategies change as the outbreak progresses "Phases"



# Potential Types of an FMD Outbreak During Phase 2



Response Shifts from Emphasis on Stamping-Out to Emphasis on Alternate Strategies (duration of FMD response)

## USDA FMD Vaccination Policy in the U.S. - September 2014

*Table 2: Current Capability of the United States to Effectively Implement Vaccination Strategy or Strategies*<sup>4</sup>

Type of Outbreak	Vaccinate-to-Kill	Vaccinate-to-Slaughter and Vaccinate-to-Live
<i>Type 1: Focal FMD</i> <i>Outbreak</i>	+	+/- (depends on regulatory infrastructure)
<i>Type 2: Moderate Regional FMD Outbreak</i>	+/- (depends on animal density)	+/- (depends on regulatory infrastructure and animal density)
Type 3: Large Regional FMD Outbreak		
Type 4: Widespread or National FMD Outbreak		
Type 5: Catastrophic U.S. FMD Outbreak		
Type 6: Catastrophic North American FMD Outbreak		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Includes, but is not limited to, vaccine quantities, time to delivery, and regulatory infrastructure (regulatory issues such as procurement, licensing, permitting, distribution, use, and traceability).

## FMD Vaccine Surge Capacity for Emergency Use in the United States

January 9, 2014

- Rapid and sustained availability of vaccine for 23 strains of FMDV
- A white paper prepared by CFSPH at ISU for:
  - National Pork Board (NPB)
  - National Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCBA)
  - National Milk Producers Federation (NMPF)



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Immediate availability:

 Finished vaccine held in vendormanaged rotating inventory ready to ship within 24 hours

For those topotypes sold regularly

Short-term availability:

 Vaccine antigen concentrate (VAC) held in vendor-managed inventory ready to be formulated and shipped
For those topotypes sold regularly

Frozen VAC bank for other strains

Long-term availability:

- Vaccine production initiated at the beginning of the outbreak. It may take up to 14 weeks to produce vaccine
- Requires investment in excess manufacturing capacity

Eventual availability:

 New technology FMD vaccines that could be safely manufactured in the U.S. and which are based on a platform that allows various capsid serotypes/topotypes to be inserted into the vaccine.

# Animal Ag Coalition has Requested **Annual** funding in the next 5 year farm bill

- \$150 million to establish an adequate FMD vaccine stockpile
- **\$30 million** to enhance the National Animal Health Laboratory Network's (NAHLN) ability to respond to a foreign animal disease emergency
- An additional \$70 million be made available to states to increase response capability through block grants administered by APHIS

## Center for Food Security and Public Health Team

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